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PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACEKEEPING IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA. THE LIBERIAN CRISIS AND ECOMOG: A BOLD ATTEMPT AT REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

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#### PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACEKEEPING IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA.

The Liberian Crisis And ECOMOG:

A BOLD ATTEMPT at REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING.

by

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#### **ABSTRACT**

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With the end of the Cold War and the official disengagement of the Western countries and their unwillingness to be involved in the eradication of Africa's many conflicts, it became clear to the African leaders that more than ever, African problems must be solved by the Africans themselves.

The Liberian civil war and the lower attention span of the world powers on the evolution of that conflict provide an indication of the trend of the restructuring occurring within the international system.

The Economic Community Monitoring Group (Ecomog) signifies the realization of a dream shared by true Africanists that Africans should take greater initiative in the resolution of their problems. It has become a model of the possibilities and problems of multilateral intervention for humanitarian assistance especially in internal security situation.

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### INTRODUCTION

After some 35 years of independence, throughout Africa, from the North to the South there has been a long period of destabilization marked by hunger, economic problems, tribal warfare, border disputes and world recession. On this continent, political institutions have not been tested long enough to assure permanency. In most countries, expectations are higher than capabilities, population growth is greater than economic growth. Unemployment is on the rise, job creation is inadequate and migrations from rural areas to urban centers very difficult to control; these conditions are the first effects of modernization and the seeds of political and social instability. With the end of the cold war, and the official disengagement of the western countries and their unwillingness to be involved in the eradication of Africa's many conflicts, it became clear to African leaders that, more than ever, African problems must be solved by the Africans themselves. Therefore African heads of state, in the frame of the Organization of African Unity seek to empower the subregional organizations to prevent or solve peacefully the conflicts between countries. This study, limited only to Sub Saharan Africa, addresses the subregional organizations in western Africa and the attempts they have made in conflict resolution. It then considers the importance of an early warning system at the subregional level and preventive diplomacy and the OAU mechanism. The paper analyzes the International Community's role and finally provides recommendations for enhanced conflict resolution.

#### A.- DEFINITIONS

# 1.- Preventive Diplomacy

Instability and violence in one country in Africa, generally affect the country's neighbors by flows of refugees, if nothing else. The conflicts, eventhough of low intensity, cannot be solved only by weapons, consequently it is necessary to explore other ways like negotiations; this is the goal of preventive diplomacy.

The two fundamental notions: preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping must be clarified.

Preventive diplomacy is, at the same time, a concept and a dynamic.<sup>1</sup> These terms were set without ambiguity in the United Nations charter at the end of World War II, to prevent all risks of conflicts between the people, the nations, the communities and the states.

They must live in a climate of cooperation based on the virtues of generosity, concertation and peace. This concept and this dynamic, has been improved and enlarged for fifteen years based on the modern world realities where politics and development, education and health, protection of human rights, and environmental priorities are mixed. In fact it includes all the rules which determine the relations between nations. Preventive diplomacy is now indispensable for the human evolution, including the governments and administration in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

### 2.- Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping in the world and particularly in the countries of the southern hemisphere is vital; it draws out the preventive diplomacy's enclosure in spirit and the mechanism which allowed the permanency of its management. In an harmonious wedding, diplomacy and military action prevention and operation, are the basis and the manifestation of peace and development.

Therefore, Mr. Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs said in March 1993:

"Resolution of Africa's many conflicts is necessary for stability, economic reform, democratization and better governance. It is wiser and less expensive to pay for conflicts prevention and resolution than to shoulder the immense burdens of refugee assistance, famine relief, emergency intervention and rebuilding destroyed infrastructures."

In the subregion, most of the military personnel have participated in peace operations with the UN or with the OAU; they consequently gained a wealth of experience in troop deployments and headquarters staff positions<sup>4</sup>. They have proven willing to participate in peace operations not only in the subregion but also anywhere else in Africa. However, acting at a subregional level, within a subregional organization, they should be more efficient.

### **B.- THE SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The need for a timely and effective approach to conflict resolution is great and resources are limited<sup>5</sup>; therefore the two functions must be conducted in a frame of subregional organizations or institutions which constitute an important part of the continental mechanism.

West African heads of states felt this necessity earlier in 1975 and formed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote the development of the subregion. The military branch was created in the 1990's to intervene in the Liberian crisis. The role of the Ecowas Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), is to prevent conflicts or reestablish peace in case of necessity in the subregion. Without peace there is no development. ECOWAS is made up of sixteen states [see map 1] For instance, ECOWAS' efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone can be examined.

In both countries the dramatically changed equations are due to a new development in the political history of the region. In each case neighboring countries, rather than former colonial powers or international bodies, have taken a stand against anarchy and begun to turn the tide.

In Liberia , the military rebellion against dictatorship had developed into a full-blown civil war in 1990, complicated by conflicts between rival factions in the insurgency movement. The resulting total disruption of the country's social, administrative, and economic infrastructure has posed a challenge and a dilemma for both the UN and the OAU: whether to adopt a comprehensive approach, including initiatives to facilitate a cease-fire and national reconciliation, or to limit themselves to providing emergency assistance when they could. Neither the UN nor the OAU were inclined to take a diplomatic or peacekeeping initiative in Liberia. They resolved their dilemma by welcoming the initiative of the members of ECOWAS.

With their encouragement, ECOWAS provided a peace plan under the provision of its Protocol on Non Aggression and dispatched in August 1990 a peacekeeping force to the Liberian capital, shortly before the defeat of President Doe's forces. By November 1990, a standing mediating committee of Ecowas was able to secure a cease-fire among the combatants while the peacekeeping force was able to serve as a cease-fire monitoring group. Furthermore, in accordance with the Ecowas peace plan, an Interim Government of National Unity was set up in Liberia until a free and fair election could be held within one year [1997] under the observation of international bodies, including the UN and the OAU. It is significant that before the Ecowas initiative, the siege and the breakdown of order in the capital and the ensuing chaos had induced the preparation of a rescue operation by US Marines to evacuate foreign citizens. Subsequently, however, unilateral action by any concerned state was obviated by the multilateral peacekeeping role of Ecowas, whose member States were keen to protect all residents of Monrovia including their own nationals. In this context the roles of the UN and the OAU were confined to providing political support to the Ecowas efforts and mobilizing emergency humanitarian assistance.

In Sierra Leonne, the war which also touched Guinea, ravaged and continued until several months ago. Recently, in January and February 1996, elections took place but the rebels, led by corporal Fode Sanko did not recognize the results. Diplomatic action facilitated a meeting between the members of the regular army and the rebels in Yamoussoukro (Ivory Cost)

Some heads of state like Presidents Diouf (Senegal), Bedie (Ivory Cost) and Eyadema (Togo) received different protagonists to establish peace while simultaneously, ECOMOG was conducting military peacekeeping operation on the terrain. The elected civilian government of President Kabbah continue negotiations with the leader of the rebels, Corporal Sanko. These are taking place in Ivory Cost; the UN, OAU and Commonwealth continue to act as facilitators.

At the last round of talks held in May 1996, agreement was reached on almost all articles of a draft peace accord. However, the talks reached an impasse on the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops and the demand by Sanko of certain posts in the government.

The government maintains that it cannot meet these demands because of constitutional constraints. Despite these problems the cease-fire has been holding since March 1996. Actually, Liberia and Sierra Leone are still unstable. But on an international plan, the UN, OAU and the US recognize ECOWAS as the only organization which has the credibility to support security and stability in AFRICA.

As mentioned, Cameroun is not a member of ECOWAS; this state has a border dispute with Nigeria which is a member. The conflict is in the hands of Ecowas which managed it in order to avoid another conflict.

Last August President Abacha accepted the proposal to send a goodwill mission to gather and examine all elements capable of bringing the parties to adopt confidence-building measures

which will help establish an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence among themselves; and to examine with the parties concrete and specific measures designed to reduce tensions among them and prevent a deterioration of the situation in the area.

The second organization, the Non Aggression and Defense Act [NADA see map 2] has only a military aspect and links seven (7) countries; it was created in 1977 for mutual assistance among members. Mali and Burkina Faso are members of Nada but in 1985, boundary problems pitted Mali against Burkina, on November 15, the Burkina armed forces occupied three Malian villages.

The two heads of state: Moussa Traore and Thomas Sankara were summoned to meet in Ivory Cost but Sankara refused. On December 25, Malian forces attacked by surprise while Burkinians were celebrating Christmas. The mediations continued and finally the conflict ended late in February 1986.

These three conflicts which killed about 300,000 people could have been avoided with the analysis of apparent factors and by an early warning system and the mediation of African personalities at a high level.

# C.- EARLY WARNING IN A SUB REGIONAL CONTEXT

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Generally, the crisis factors are easy to understand. Ethnic, economic and boundary problems are classic and the most known. They involve social troubles<sup>6</sup>. The effects of modernization as mentioned in the introduction also are factors of social instability and the political problems must be considered.

Early warning in a sub regional context is a concrete answer to the various issues relating to the gathering, analysis and dissemination of information within the framework of a rapid warning system to be set up at the regional level. The real problem is not just early warning, but translating knowledge of an impending crisis into a preventive action. The usefulness of the exchange of information and setting up of data banks at subregional level information, is unanimously acknowledged. Important elements of information include the description of countries and areas in tension and a list of personalities whose assistance can be solicited for mediation.

It is noteworthy that since the independence of African nations any inter African litigation has required the personal intervention of one or more heads of state. Africa is an open continent where information circulates easily; the sources of information are various for example: diplomats, journalists, non governmental organizations and the member states of the subregion can provide information on the issues which eventually can lead to conflicts as well as information on how to resolve these issues.

Generally crises do not explode brutally, secretly or suddenly; they are always the results of known situations. Therefore, circulation and analysis of information are indispensable for early warning and conflict prevention. The essential role of the OAU mechanism for the management and prevention of conflicts as a central organ whose mechanism and political instrument is accepted and recognized by all African states. The need to define a cooperation framework for OAU and subregional institutions as obtains between OAU and UN is clear.

From this point of view, the subregion will need to have an information network which will be integrated into that of OAU as well as the UN network. A well structured and constant information exchange system linking OAU, the UN and the subregional data bank relating to threats of conflicts can be envisaged to coordinate their initiatives and actions. However, to facilitate this process, it would be necessary to mobilize the indispensable financial and technical assistance to

improve upon the operational capacity of the sub regions. Information collected and transmitted with normal delays, allows the starting of preventive diplomacy.

#### D.- PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE OAU MECHANISM

The idea of decentralizing the OAU Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Settlement of Conflicts (MPMSC) was developed a long time ago. It constitutes a consensus based on the need to make subregional organizations responsible for preventive diplomacy by proximity, to seek the contributions of eminent personalities whose mediation can help to prevent conflicts and set up subregional political structures they can institutionalize them as decentralized mechanisms for conflict prevention.

These subregional mechanisms will depend on the OAU mechanism through cooperation agreements to be established with the latter. Nevertheless, the OAU mechanism will play the leading role and will remain the supervising agency within the framework of preventive diplomacy<sup>7</sup>.

A trustworthy cooperation should be established between the OAU mechanism and the subregional mechanism. The means will also be decentralized in favor of subregional prevention mechanisms in order to enable them become effectively operational. The support of the international community in several domains will be necessary for the launching of preventive diplomacy; this idea will be developed later.

Preventive diplomacy leads naturally to peacekeeping; in this case, general aspects, political and legal aspects will be analyzed before the operational aspects. Indeed the main purpose of the OAU mechanism is to anticipate and prevent conflicts. But when there is a conflict it must restore and strengthen peace, according to the wish of African heads of state or government. This is the objective of peacekeeping.

### E.- PEACEKEEPING. GENERAL ASPECTS.

No one today can deny the role of the UN in peacekeeping in the regions where peace is at stake as well as those of the African organization throughout the continent. However, there is still a problem of delays in the mobilization of forces, a problem which has been discussed in many seminars on the issue.

Following the seminars of Accra, Cairo, Harare and Gaborone to mention only the most recent meetings, the Dakar Seminar (December 14-15 1995) has led to a consensus on the principle of standby forces to facilitate the emergency mobilization of contingents in a subregional framework for the execution of the UN mandates in cooperation with the OAU for peacekeeping. Nevertheless there are important political, logistical and financial and operational problems.

# 1.- The political level

In the recent past, African countries were jealous of there sovereignty and did not understand the benefits of a global cooperation in the matter of defense. But the reality of conflicts and the difficulties to find adequate and durable solutions lead the heads of states to review the multiple failures in their individual system.

Now the legal basis for setting up of standby modules already exists. These modules require, to be credible, commitment between the countries that are willing to supply the contingents while reasserting the central place of the OAU through the MPMSC adopted in Cairo (Egypt) at the 29th OAU summit conference in 1993.

The subregion seems to be an appropriate framework to facilitate the setting up of these modules. Once this step is reached, the second problem whose solution cannot be accomplished only by Africans is logistic and financial.

# 2.- Logistic and financial

The sub saharan countries are underdeveloped and cannot provide for all their needs. In addition to local contributions, the realization of these modules of standby forces would require the logistic and financial assistance of the international community( UN, OAU, US, foreign organizations etc...) This assistance is also needed for the training and instruction of contingents, for equipment and the deployment of troops.

In the particular case of Ecomog, even if it was easier for the bigger and more advanced countries like Nigeria and Ghana to ensure the transportation of their troops, it certainly would not have been so easy for the smaller ones like Gambia, Guinea, and Senegal. For example, the US provided logistic support to Senegal (battle-dress, transportation to Sierra Leone, money), Guinea used Senegaleese trucks to get to the neighboring Sierra Leone. In all, a total of ten days were spent in the transit camp of Sierra Leone before the Ecomog troops set out on the voyage to Monrovia on August 23,1990.

Once the troops landed at the Port, they disembarked from the ship and in a file to go and settle in their designated sector within the port. There was just one open place, where the troops, after some mini military drills and a parade, sat on the bare floor waiting for the next ration or the next order. This delay of the deployment of the Ecomog force from Sierra-Leonne to Liberia was due to logistic and technical problems, rather than the threat from the National Patrioc Front of Charles Taylor. On the other hand, Gambia and Guinea were unable to support their own troops deployed in Liberia, financially and logistically.

# 3.- Operational Level

Following the logistical and financial aspects the operational level presents some discontinuities which can be avoided by the creation of, as soon as possible of a light coordinating and follow-up structure. Its main assignment, in order to facilitate the emergency mobilization of the standby modules would include: identification and inventory of the capabilities of national contingents which are assigned to peacekeeping; the pooling of subregional resources for instruction and training; cooperation with relevant organization of the UN, OAU or any other contributing organizations; and coordination of military, civilian and police actions in peacekeeping.

It is also noteworthy that the necessary structures for the management of a multilateral force was lacking in Ecowas, consequently, a unified command in Ecomog was hazy. The differences between anglophones and francophones in language and in doctrine created initially some major problems at a tactical level.

Exchange of information, mutual consultation, the sending of joint missions and the coordination by OAU of diplomatic moves are what constitute the foundation of a good preventive diplomacy within the OAU mechanism. As regards peacekeeping operations, if the Declaration of CAIRO emphasizes the African states contribution in the UN framework, it does not rule out the possibility of limited observation missions under the aegis of the OAU. African countries' experience within the UN has shown that if the states were willing to contribute troops, their inadequate logistical and financial means would not permit them to transport and deploy efficiently the promised troops<sup>8</sup>.

Hence the idea of training and pre-positioning troops ready to be deployed as soon as possible. The OAU is considering the feasibility of this option, but remains conscious that the logistical, strategic and tactical means needed for such a project are not available.

This is where Africa (OAU) request substantial assistance from the International Community and mainly from the traditional partners.

## F.- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ROLE

## 1.- The United States' Role

The USA, by the voice of Mr. Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in 1993, pursued conflict resolution in Africa as a crucial first step toward improving those factors which lead to stability, the rule of law and good government. The USA approached conflict resolution and peacemaking in four (4) ways:

- Preventive diplomacy which is a core part of US policy and programs in Africa; the US strives whenever possible to avert the costs of human suffering that conflicts invariably cause.
- Multilateral diplomacy ,by working closely with the UN and African regional institutions including OAU and ECOWAS, which have the credibility to support security and stability.
- Participation in mediation efforts. There are, for the US, often advantages to working in partnership with other countries to broker and \or implement agreements to end conflicts.
- Informal cooperation with such organizations as the Global Coalition for Africa, the Africa Leadership Forum ,the African American Institute , the Carter Center, Africare and many other NGO which are striving to develop creative new approaches to conflict resolution in Africa at all levels.

Of critical importance is the reinforcement of the ability of Africans to resolve their internal and regional conflicts. Consequently, much of US assistance concentrates on building the conflict resolution capacity of existing organizations such as OAU and ECOWAS. On September 25,1991, the US government underscored its support of the regional initiative by making available \$ 500,000 in peacekeeping funds to Ecowas. It also announced that it was providing bilateral grants of \$3.75

million in Foreign Military Financing funds to support the Ecowas peace progress "and Ecomog participants who are in the most dire financial circumstances."

On October 3, 1991 the United States announced that it had granted an additional \$3.3 million dollars to help peacekeeping forces in Liberia and urged all nations to support the peace process there. On the other hand, the OAU is developing a permanent peacekeeping structure and the US has already provided technical assistance in support of that effort. Recently on February 1, 1996, in a joint conference at the occasion of an official visit of the French President, US President Clinton declared: "In Africa, both our countries today are working to help people realize their tremendous economic and political potential. Today President Chirac and I agreed to work together on preventive diplomacy in Africa to begin to head off the conflicts before they start". It is obvious that conflict resolution, peace and stability and political reform are still significant US concerns in Africa, even if it has no vital interests in the region.

#### 2.- The Roles of Other Parteners

1) The World Bank and the Donor Nations.

The World Bank and the Donor Nations provide assistance in the reduction of oversized military forces and redefinition of the remaining forces such as in Uganda, and in Angola.

2) European Community, International Financial Institutions and the UN Agencies, are important contributors to African development and share with some developed nations an understanding of interest in Africa's need for internal stability.

#### 3) The UN initiative

The UN has today emerged a focal point for international efforts to promote peace-building, peacekeeping, and national reconciliation throughout Africa. The United Nations System wide

Special Initiative on Africa reflects the determination to work collectively for the enhancement of African capacities and development. <sup>10</sup> The Initiative contains three actions to strengthen peacemaking and peace -building in Africa: first, strengthening the OAU's capacity for peace-building, second, strengthening selected civil society organizations engaged in peace-building, third, utilizing mass media to enhance communication for peace-building. However, special provisions should be made to enhance the role of the women and the women's organizations in peace-building.

Communication is vital in the system because it's well recognized that most of the difficulties encountered by African countries undergoing democratic transition or facing internal conflict are due to the fact that the mass of the people have limited access to basic information which would empower them to express their views and opinions about significant development problems and to participate in a process of democratic transition and conflict resolution. In addition, some cases have been recently noted whereby the media has been instrumental in inciting hate and contributing to the disintegration of a country.

As now being increasingly reflected in the actions of those promoting peace-building in Africa, particularly in the OAU and the United Nations, the primary goal of building a sustainable peaceful environment in Africa requires continuous efforts to reduce and eliminate the sources of conflict and instability within the countries. UNESCO intends to do this by reinforcing a culture of learning, tolerance and acceptance of all peoples and groups to help build confidence among peoples in their solidarity.

The lessons learned from the past peacekeeping missions in Africa gauge the capacity of African states, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) to take more responsibilities for peacekeeping and assess what kind of outside assistance could enable African

institutions to be more effective peacemakers and consider the role of the international community in conflict resolution in Africa. The post-Cold War environment has brought a new emphasis on conflict resolution, which is seen as a precondition to further economic and social development and democratization. In these conditions, what principles should guide African efforts to deal with conflicts?

#### G.- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

1. - African leaders should clearly define norms and standards such as respect for election outcomes and the inviolability of borders, the violation of which would prompt collective intervention.

In effect, the absence of clearly defined norms and standards for dealing with the causes and manifestation of conflict in Africa contribute to the lack of an effective response mechanism. Although the inviolability of borders has been upheld as a norm since the founding of the OAU, similar norm-building should occur on issues such democratization, sovereignty, and border delimitation and demarcation. Regarding democratization, efforts should be focused on ensuring that governments uphold basic human rights, tolerate opposition, and respect election outcomes.

- 2. African leaders should determine under what conditions it is helpful to have the international community engaged in conflict resolution efforts because in some instances,"African solutions to African problems" may be appropriate, while in others, the engagement of the international community may be desirable.
- 3. African leaders should consider whether, in some instances, power-sharing or coalition government may be a desirable short term or transitional device to resolve intrastate and interethnic conflict; in a post conflict environment, these measures can instill confidence in a new political institutions and entice all significant parties to a dispute to accept them.

- 4. African leaders should take advantages of the possibilities of the peacekeeping training centers in Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa to set up specific doctrine and rules for African peacekeeping operations. The capacity of the OAU mechanism for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict should be strengthened and must include training and professionalizing staff, developing an information or documentation center to provide analysis to staff and diplomats, and creating a cadre of capable diplomats trained in negotiation, mediation, and problem-solving skills who can be quickly deployed to attenuate incipient conflicts.
- 5. -The conflict resolution capacities of regional or subregional organizations should be bolstered; resorting to the OAU is not necessarily a first or best step. For example, when the OAU was unable to or unwilling to act in Liberia civil war in 1990, ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping mission to restore order and promote negotiations.
- 6. -The work of NGOs in intervening to resolve dispute should be improved, as well as their capacity to provide policy relevant information and analysis. They can play an important role in intervening in conflict situation, often at an unofficial level, to ease tensions or provide mediation and facilitation functions.

### CONCLUSION

Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa, as elsewhere, is not a labor of a day or of a week. African initiatives exemplify the growing resolve of Africans to take responsibility for their own problems.

The task is arduous. Africa needs to live in peace, and to work in harmony and simplicity, complementary and permanent consultation are needed for a more rational efficient and economical use of the very limited means available.


The first level of assuring peace and security lies with the people in countries themselves. When consensus is not achieved at the national level, it must be accomplished at the regional or subregional level. The experiences of history are that newly established country's mature over a period of decades and centuries. What is required is patience and perseverance, rather than defeatism, because this process takes time.

The threatening collapse of the African political and economic systems and the renewed waves of conflicts experienced by the continent, have a direct linkage to the events occurring in the international system. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union as a super power state and the abandoning of the rivalry between the two global powers blows for ascendancy have resulted in the decline of great powers in African politics. The Liberian civil war and the low attention span of the world powers on the evolution of that conflict provide an indication of the trend of the restructuring occurring within the international system.

ECOMOG signifies a realization of a dream shared by true Africanists that Africans should take greater initiative in the resolution of their problems. The deployment of the force was riddled with various problems: the subregional organization had not erected the necessary structures for


the management of a multilateral force, the concept of a unified command for the force was hazy, but in spite of all these problems, the force has been in operation for over two years and has succeeded in stabilizing the Liberian crisis at a much lower level. This belies the hitherto widely held assumption that collective security strategy in Africa was an impossibility. Given the intractability of the internal crisis in Yugoslavia where the UN has a peacekeeping force deployed, the achievement of ECOMOG may be describe as a "historical feat."

ECOMOG has become a model of the possibilities and problems of multilateral intervention for humanitarian assistance especially in internal security situation. As Africa attempts to meet the difficult challenge of conflict resolution, the partners intend to remain involved to help ensure the success of practical mechanisms and long term efforts to build trust, tolerance and accountability.



The Eonomic Community Of West African Countries.( 1975 )

Ecomog became the Military Instrument in 1990.



The Non Aggression and Defense ACT ( 1977 )

Burkina Fasso, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo.

Miltary strength: 52,000 men.

### **ENDNOTES**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Niasse Moustapha. Senegaleese Minister of Foreign Relations. Statement at the opening Session of Dakar seminar, on Preventive Diplomacy. Dakar December 14,15, 1995.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Cohen, Herman, US Assistant Secretar y For African Affairs. Statement before the Sub Committee on Africa, Washington DC, March 31, 1993.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Henk Dan, "Africans and Peace Operations: Views From Southern and Eastern Africa"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Vijay, S, Mahan , UN Assistant Secretary. Statement at the Dakar Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy. December 14, 15, 1995

 $<sup>^6</sup>$  Destan , Jean Louis. Document submited at the Francophone International Meeting for the Prevention Of Conflicts. Ottaw a ,September 19, 1995

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Ghali Boutros Boutros, UN Seccretary General." Peacekeeping Future Ages" Armees D'Ajurdhui ,October 1995

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Vijay,S, Mahan. Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Cohen, Herman Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See UN Initiative Booklet, January 18,1997

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